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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vsESTATE OF B. J. Silliman, Deceased,
KENNETH SILLIMAN, Executor,
DefendantRespondent.

Case No.
11,301

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent admits that the statement of facts as
setforth in appellant's brief are substantially correct exL:ept the following items should be added or modified:
(a) A portion of the subject land is drained by
washes and gullies, but the greater portion is flat and
level and is covered with the usual desert grazing foilage.
(b) A portion of the subject land borders and is adjacent to the Green River City limits for a distance of

1f2 mile where there is available to the property sewer
and water facilities; the property is traversed by a power
line and telephone line and the Denver and Rio Grande
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Western Railroad traverses through a large section of
the property for a distance of % of a mile with a railroad siding and railroad-truck dumping

facilities~

(Ex.

P-1 & E.x. D-2 and testimony of Kenneth N. Silliman, Tr.
30)

(c) That the property adjacent to the railroad siding and dumping area where taken in fee completely by
the State.
(d) After acquisition by the State, the respondent
will have no access to the property North of the project
except for that area North of the railroad tracks upon
which is located the air strip of the Green River Airport,
or South of the project, except for a very limited access
to the extreme Southeast portion of the property by
County Road over extremely rough terrain. (See testimony of Appellant's witness W. J. Merkley, Tr. 17 & 19)
1

The respondent further admits that the only issue
tried was the evaluation of the property to be expropriated,
and damages, if any, by reason of severance, less benefit
accruing, if any, by reason of construction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A
NE1W TRIAL.
The trial court, acting within its discretion, refused
a motion by the appellant for a new trial conditioned on
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respondent's accepting a remittitur of the severance damages of $2,536.00 which reduced the severance damages
from $15,023,.50 to $12,487.50. The latter figure being the
amount of the severance damage as testified to by Kenneth N. Silliman and the two expert witnesses for respondent.
In the recent case of The State of Utah by and through
its Road Commission vs. George Kendell, et. al., 20 Utah
2nd 356, 438 P. 2nd 178, this Court said:
"The law is well settled in this State that the
trial court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
order a remittitur in lieu of granting a new trial where
damages appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah
340, 255 P. 416. In Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431,
184 P. 2d 123, this court said at page 436 of the Utah
Reports:
'Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
.acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict set
aside and a new trial granted . . . But mere excessiveness of a verdict, without more, does not
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at
by passion or prejudice .... It is true that the verdict might be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that we could say from that
fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict must
have been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But
the facts must be such that the excess can be de-·
termined as a matter of law, or the verdict must
be so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice,
or corruption on the part of the jury ... '
The matter of any passion or prejudice, if any, on the
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part of the jury was answered by the trial court when the
remittitur was ordered and accepted. In any event, the
amount of the excessiveness in this case would certainly
not be "shocking to one's conscience" and the Court did
not abuse its discretion when the amount fixed as severance damage was supported by sworn testimony.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE; ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT'S CLOSING STATEMENT IN
EXPRESSING LOSS OF INCOME AS AN E:LEMENT OF
DETERMINING MARKET VALUE.
There was testimony that there existed the refuse
dump of Green River City on a portion of the property
being taken by the appellant and that there was an income to the defendant from the dump in the sum of $30.00
per month. The dump was located in the South portion of
the area colored blue on defendant's

E~hibit

2, (Tr. 36).

The testimony of Mr. J. W. Hammond, Jr., (Tr. 68)
as set out in appellant's brief, page 8, shows that the element of loss of rental income under these circumstances
was considered by him in arriving at market value.
A multitude of cases are cited supporting this general
proposition as set out in 65 ALR 456, where it is stated:
"As a general rule courts accede to the rule th.at
income from property in the way of rents and profits
is an element of consideration in arriving at the market value or measure of compensation to be paid for
taking property in condemnation proceedings."
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For a similar statement see 18 Am. Jur. 902. And in
29A C. J. S. 1198, we find the following:
"Although testimony pertaining to income derived mainly from the skill of the operator of a business rather than from the productivity of the property should be excluded, the annual rent or income which
it produces, and the profits derived from the use of the
property are admissable whenever they would be an
indication of value.
Respondent's councel, in his closing argument, merely
made the following comment:
"So he (Mr. Hammond) placed a value on that
property, increased its value, because of its income of
$'3,000.00" (Tr. 234).
The argument was a proper statement of how Mr.
Hammond arrived at his appraisal figure.
However, the objection raised by appellant under this
Point, if error was committed, was not prejudicial since
the jury did not accept Mr. Hammond's figures on the
value of the property taken.
POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT E:RR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE: TESTIMONY
DF RESPONDENT'S APPRAISEHS:
A. RESPONDENT'S \VITNESS, MR. KENNE,TH N. SILLIMAN, DIJD BASE HIS TESTIMONY ON A BEFORE
AND AFTER VALUE.
All of respondent's witnesses placed different values
upon different parcels of land according to their highest
and best use and testified from Defendant's Exhibit 2
where the different parcels were set out in different colors
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with the acreage of each parcel inserted on the exhibit
(See the stipulation of counsel, Tr. 38).
Mr. Silliman testified to an acre value on each parcel

without computing the totals and was then pressed on cross
examination by the appellant's councel to give such a total.
Q. Mr. Silliman, do you have an opinion as to the value of the property prior to the acquistion on July 9,
1966? I think I finished. I might have missed a word.
Do you have an opinion as to the value of the subject
property A. In what area?
Q. - prior to the acquisition date of July 9, 1966?
A. In what area? Taking the area?
Q. The pink area?

A. Beg Pardon?
Q. The pink area that you see on Plaintiff's Exhibit

No. 1?
A. Well, it would have a different value with me. It
would, as I have already stated, the part up by the
east and by the railroad would have a Q. Well, do you have a total value? If you were to SB:Y
for instance testify to the value of all the area that is
enclosed in the pink as to its value ?

. . . ..

Q. Mr. Silliman, do you have an opinion of the value

of the subject property prior to the acquisition by the
State?
A. Now my opinion of what it was worth?
Q. W·ell, you have stated an opinion on the. ~tand;
whatever opinion you prefer to call it; your op1mon or
someone else's opinion.
A. Well, but do you - are you going to con~ider th~
land values of the various areas we have designated·
Q. If I may ask the questions. I didn't know how you
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broke it down. But if you were to offer the pink portions for sale, Mr. Silliman, what would you say they
were worth prior to the acquisition by the State? You
have a before value?
A. I thought that is the testimony that I gave. (Tr. 39

40

& 41)

'

Mr. Silliman was then further pressed and gave the
answer set out in appellant's brief, "I - - approximately
$50,000.00."

Immediately following this approximation we find this
question by appellant's counsel and this answer by Mr.
Silliman:
Q. Do you have a total value?

A. No, sir, I don't. I would have to add that up and
multiple it. (Tr. 43)
B. THE OPINIJ:Pel OF RESPONDENT'S WITNEISS, MR.
CARL J. LEAVITT, WAS BASED ON FAIR MARKET
VALUE AND AS OF THE DATE OF TAKING.
Mr. Leavitt was the President of the Bank in Green
River, Utah, and has been appraising property in that area
since 1941. (Tr. 91 & 92) He was asked the following questions on direct examination.
Q. And now, Mr. Leavitt, or perhaps we can save time
in referring to Exhibit 2. You were present when Mr.
Hammond testified, were you not?

A. Yes.
Q. And without going specifically into each of the colored areas that - well, let me ask you this. Mr. Leavitt, of course you have seen this exhibit before you
were here in court today?

A. Right.
Q. You examined it in my office. Is that correct?
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A. Right.
Q. Without going into specifically the various colors
I will ask you whether or not your testimony as to
your opinion as to reasonable value would be the same
as Mr. Hammond's?
A. Yes. (Tr. 94 & 95)

Mr. Hammond's testimony was very explicit that the

appraisal was made as of the date of taking and that the
willing ·seller-willing buyer principal was the proper principal to apply in determing market value.
C. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR.
J. W. HAMMOND, DID NO'l' SHOW ANY SPECIAL BENEFITS TO DEDUCT FROM SEV·ERANCE DAMAGES.
Mr. Hammond testified on cross examination as fol-

lows:

Q. Do you have an opinion as to the benefits derived?
A. No, I have no opinion. (Tr. 88)
The matter was further covered by him as follows:
Q. Mr. Hammond, in your opinion then the benefit derived from the remaining property can be more than
the severance damage suffered by the estate of B. J.
Silliman. Is that true?

A. I have no opinion as to that because I don't know
the extent of their holdings. It is just my understanding that they do have, knowing these people, that they
do have some additional property north of there. I
don't know how much they have. I have no opinion as
to that. I haven't, I haven't even thought about it. (Tr.
89)
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CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial. If there was any
passion or prejudice shown by the jury the court corrected
that matter in ordering the remittitur in the amount of
severance damage to conform to the evidence presented.
The great discrepancy in the appraised value between
the witnesses for the appellant ($6,296.. 50) and the appraisal of the witnesses for the respondent ($54,234.70)
was a difference in the classification of use of the property. Appellant's witnesses gave the land only one use;
grazing, except for Mr. Memory Cain who gave a commercial use to two acres of the 633.7 acres involved. (Tr. 119)
Respondent's witnesses gave the land three uses, depending on location and accessibility to highway, railroad, utilities and Green River City Limits; commercial, industrial
and grazing. There. was presented evidence of other sales
of land in the area similar to a portion of the respondent's
land where the other land sold for $1,000.00 per acre or
more. (Tr. 32 & 33, Tr. 118). This evidence gave credence
to the testimony of respondent's witnesses and the jury
obviously accepted evidence as presented by both parties
and returned a verdict of considerably less thatl the respondent's introduced opinions and more than those of the
appellant.
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The jury at the conclusion of the evidence, on motion
of the appellant, viewed the premises, considered all of
the evidence and arrived at a reasonable verdict. I am sure
a new trial would give us a similar result.
Respectfully Submitted,
BOYD BUNNELL
Attorney for Respondent
Oliveto Building
Price, Utah

